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Houston owes $8.2 billion in pension debt, plus an additional $586 million in pension 
obligation bonds. As a result, the city does not have enough money to pay for nearly 
half  of  the benefits that workers have already earned. 
This debt has had a direct impact on the city’s finances and its ability to provide 
essential public services. For example, the number of  public safety personnel has 
declined during the past decade, even as spending on public safety has risen—driven 
by a 55 percent increase in pension costs. 
Without reforms to the pension systems, the city’s financial problems will get worse. 
In light of  the serious issues facing Houston, Mayor Sylvester Turner developed a 
proposal that would make a number of  changes to the city’s pension systems. The 
city is currently seeking approval from the Texas Legislature to implement the 
proposal, as the state controls the city’s police, fire, and municipal employees pension 
plans.
The proposed changes include lowering the plans’ assumed rate of  return on 
investments; reducing benefits for public workers; and implementing a financial 
corridor provision that would cap the city’s contributions to the pension systems, 
and provide a mechanism to address future cost increases. The city would also issue a 
total of  $1 billion in pension obligation bonds to provide lump-sum payments to the 
police and municipal employees plans. 
If  approved by the state legislature, the proposal would place the plans and the city 
on firmer financial footing. It would also accomplish key principles of  responsible 
pension reform. Specifically, it would provide a plan to pay down the pension debt in 
30 years or less and would limit the city’s—and ultimately, taxpayers’—exposure to 
cost increases. 
However, public workers, who have already agreed to $2.5 billion in concessions, 
are poised to shoulder considerably more risk under the proposal. If  the city’s 
contribution rates hit or surpass the cap, workers would be required to make 
additional benefit changes in order to bring costs back below the cap. 
At a Glance
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The impact of the corridor provision on workers would depend on the plans’  
investment performance and demographic trends. For example, the Laura and John 
Arnold Foundation’s (LJAF) modeling shows that if the police plan’s investment 
portfolio earned average investment returns of 7 percent during the next decade, 
there would be a two in five (40 percent chance that the city’s contribution rate 
would hit the cap for the police fund at least once by 2027. There would be roughly a 
one in three (33 percent) chance that the city would hit that rate at least twice within 
that time period.
If the police plan performs as expected, the odds would be one in three 
(33 percent that contribution rates for members of the plan would increase by five 
percentage points or more during the next 10 years.
The corridor provision could prove to be unsustainable in the long run if workers 
bear a disproportionate share of pension costs. Given this risk, city leaders must 
take steps to protect public employees. This includes limiting the amount of money 
invested in volatile, hard-to-value assets such as real estate, private equity, and hedge 
funds. 
The city should also consider enrolling new workers in retirement systems that are 
simpler and easier to manage, such as a Defined Contribution plan or a Cash Balance 
plan. These plans would limit the accrual of additional pension debt and provide the 
city with the flexibility to respond to changing economic and demographic trends. 
Houston’s financial future will depend in large part on decisions made in the next 
month. The city’s proposal represents meaningful progress toward establishing a fair 
and sustainable solution to its pension problems. Houston should have the 
opportunity to implement reforms developed by local stakeholders in order to 
improve the pension plans’ financial stability.  
3www.arnoldfoundation.org
www.pensionsecurity.org
Introduction
Houston has experienced record growth during the last decade. Yet despite its strong economic 
performance, the fourth-largest city in the United States is facing financial challenges caused by 
years of  mismanagement of  its public pension systems. According to local officials, Houston 
owes $8.2 billion in pension debt, plus an additional $586 million in pension obligation bonds—
more than any other city in Texas.  
This growing unfunded liability has had a direct impact on city finances. Today, Houston does 
not have enough money to pay for nearly half  of  the retirement benefits workers have already 
earned. Moreover, local officials have been forced to dedicate more of  the budget to pension 
payments, leaving less money for critical public services. During the last 10 years, the city has cut 
public safety positions, even as spending on public safety has grown by hundreds of  millions of  
dollars due to a 55 percent increase in pension costs.
In light of  the serious issues facing Houston’s pension systems, Mayor Sylvester Turner 
developed a reform plan following discussions with the Houston Police Officers’ Pension 
System (HPOPS), Houston Municipal Employees Pension System (HMEPS), and the Houston 
Firefighters’ Relief  and Retirement Fund (HFRRF) that is intended to address flaws in the city’s 
pension funding practices. 
Under the proposal, the city would lower its assumed rate of  return on pension investments; 
reduce benefits for current workers and retirees; and implement a financial corridor provision 
that would cap the city’s contributions to the pension systems and provide a mechanism to 
address future cost increases. Houston would also issue $1 billion in pension obligation bonds to 
provide an infusion of  cash into the two plans facing the largest deficits—the municipal 
employees plan and the police plan. 
The proposal incorporates key principles of  responsible pension reform. It establishes a road 
map to pay down the pension debt in 30 years or less and would reduce the city’s exposure to 
risk by lowering investment return assumptions. It would also provide substantial new 
protections for taxpayers. However, public workers’ exposure to risk would increase, as the 
financial corridor provision would require employees to make benefit changes if  the city’s 
pension costs were to exceed the cap. 
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In the short term, the proposal would place the pension plans—and the city—on firmer financial 
footing. The long-term impact would depend on how the changes are implemented. A key caveat 
is that the Texas Legislature ultimately controls Houston’s pension plans, and local officials and 
the pension boards must seek approval from state lawmakers before implementing many of  the 
proposal’s provisions. Given that the legislature meets every two years, Houston leaders have a 
limited window to seek such approval. 
This brief  examines various aspects of  Houston’s pension reform plan in order to provide 
policymakers, workers, taxpayers, and other members of  the public with a better understanding 
of  how the proposal would affect the city’s pension systems. In addition, the brief  explains the 
risks for current and future workers, and outlines safeguards—such as improvements to the 
plans’ investment policies and stronger transparency measures—intended to protect workers and 
taxpayers.
In the short term, the proposal would place the pension 
plans—and the city—on firmer financial footing. The 
long-term impact would depend on how the changes 
are implemented.  
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Rising pension debt in Houston has prompted significant financial challenges. In 2016, Houston 
ended the year with its first-ever operating deficit, which Mayor Turner said was directly tied to 
unfunded liabilities and growing pension payments. The seriousness of  this trend is evidenced  
by a recent report from Moody’s Investors Service, which ranked Houston fourth in the 
country among large metropolitan areas for the size of  debt compared to revenue.1 According 
to Moody’s, Houston’s pension debt is four times larger than general fund revenue, which means 
that the city is at risk of  not being able to pay its retirement promises in full.
Due to Houston’s growing unfunded liabilities, Actuarially Determined Contributions—or the 
amount needed to cover the cost of  new benefits earned by workers each year along with the 
contributions needed to pay down the debt—have increased by $284 million since 2000. The 
city’s recommended contributions are now equivalent to nearly 20 percent of  general fund  
revenue; however, Houston has failed to contribute the recommended amount each year since 
2006. Thus, even though Houston is paying millions of  dollars more into its pension funds  
annually, the contributions are still not enough to cover the full cost of  its retirement promises. 
The Current Situation
1 Aaron, Thomas and Blake, Timothy. (Nov. 4, 2016). “Pensions Increasingly Prominent in Credit Profiles of  Many Large Local 
   Governments.” Moody’s Investors Service.
Table 1. Houston’s Pension Debt Is Four Times Larger Than 
 General Fund Revenue
Pension Obligation 
Bonds Payable $586 Million
Source: Authors’ calculations; City of  Houston, Houston Firefighters’ Relief  and Retirement 
Fund, Houston Municipal Employees Pension System, and Houston Police Officers’ Pension 
System comprehensive annual financial reports; Houston Firefighters’ Relief  and Retirement 
Fund, Houston Municipal Employees Pension System, and Houston Police Officers’ Pension 
System actuarial valuation reports; Guide to Public Retirement Systems in Texas by the Texas 
Pension Review Board; State Pension Review Board of  Texas Board Meeting –- November 3, 
2016 by the Texas Pension Review Board; HPOPS Pension Reform Cost Analysis by the City 
of  Houston and Retirement Horizons Inc.; and HMEPS Pension Reform Cost Analysis by 
the City of  Houston and Retirement Horizons Inc. 
*Actuarially Determined Contribution (ADC). 
Note: Pension debt is estimated using market value of  assets and Governmental Accounting 
Standards Board (GASB) results in accordance with Statements Nos. 67 and 68 for the 
Houston Municipal Employees Pension System and the Houston Police Officers’ Pension 
System. Data corresponds to Fiscal Year 2016, which ends June 30, 2017. 
Pension Plan $8,208 55% 100.0% $423
Houston Firefighters’ Relief  
and Retirement Fund $1,588 70% 19% $87
Houston Municipal Employees 
Pension System $3,182 43% 39% $175
Houston Police Officers’ 
Pension System $3,437 54% 42% $160
Share of  
Total 
Shortfall
ADC* 
(in Millions)
Funded 
Ratio
Pension 
Debt
(in Millions)
General Fund Revenue $2,294 Million
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As pension costs have risen, officials have been left with less money to spend on infrastructure  
improvements and critical public services. The most notable example of  this problem is the 
budgetary constraints facing the city’s police and fire departments. The number of  public safety 
personnel has declined by 1.9 percent since 2007. Yet public safety costs have grown by $475 
million—driven by a 55 percent increase in pension costs. This is especially troubling given 
Houston’s rapid population growth during the last decade. More than 125,000 people moved to 
the greater Houston region in 2016 alone, creating new demands for public safety services and 
further exacerbating the funding problems.2
Projections show that Houston’s pension debt will continue to grow unless the city improves 
its pension funding practices. Currently, the plans use what is known as an “open amortization” 
schedule to calculate payments to the pension systems. Under this method, the plans reset 
the payment period each year. This means that pension debt will never be fully paid off, and 
Houston will incur costly periods of  negative amortization, or compounding interest, which will 
cause unfunded liabilities to increase.  
Furthermore, Houston currently assumes that it will earn returns of  8 percent or more on the 
plans’ investments. These investment assumptions are among the highest in the nation, and the 
funds have repeatedly earned less than expected.3  In fact, during the past 10 years, the plans 
have averaged returns of  just 6.2 percent. The city has failed to contribute enough to cover these 
shortfalls, which has added to the rising debt. 
By using overly optimistic investment return assumptions to calculate pension payments, the 
plans have mischaracterized to taxpayers the cost of  providing benefits. It is unlikely that the 
funds will achieve their current expected rate of  return in either the short or long term, and 
therefore, the cost to taxpayers of  providing benefits is ultimately much higher than local  
officials have reported in recent years. For example, in 2016, the most recent year for which  
comprehensive annual financial reports are available, the plans reported it would cost $15.7  
billion to pay for liabilities, which are the benefits that workers have already earned. However, 
using an assumed rate of  return of  7 percent, which is a more reasonable expectation for future 
returns, liabilities increase to $18.4 billion. Under this more reasonable investment return  
assumption, pension debt increases from $5.5 billion to $8.2 billion.
Projections show that Houston’s pension debt will 
continue to grow unless the city improves its pension 
funding practices.
2 Kriel, Lomi. (March 23, 2017). “Harris County drops to No. 2 nationally in population growth, according to Census data.” Houston 
  Chronicle. Retrieved from http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Harris-County-drops-to-No-
2-nationally-in-11024290.php.
3 The median investment return assumption for public pension plans is 7.6 percent.
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Although Houston must make changes to the pension system to improve its financial stability 
and pay down its unfunded liabilities, given the size of  its debt, it will not be financially feasible 
to simply change the funding practices. Forecasts released by the city indicate that if  it were to 
lower its investment rate to 7 percent and commit to paying down the debt in 30 years or less, 
the recommended contribution rate for the police plan alone would increase by nearly 18  
percentage points to 59.4 percent of  payroll for Fiscal Year 2018.4 This means that for every 
dollar the city spends on police payroll costs, it would need to contribute 59 cents to the pension 
system largely in order to pay off  its debts. This would require astronomical tax increases or cuts 
to public services.
In comparison, if  the city were to lower its expected investment rate to 7 percent for the fire 
plan, the city’s recommended contribution rate would increase from 30.8 percent of  payroll  
to 70 percent of  payroll. Similarly, the city’s recommended contribution for the municipal 
employees plan would increase from about 31.8 percent of  payroll to 39.4 percent of  payroll. 
Thus, reforming the pension system and balancing the budget will require shared sacrifice from 
all stakeholders, including both workers and taxpayers. In December, Mayor Turner said he 
would not “sugar-coat” the dramatic increase in pension payments.5 He has worked with mem-
bers of  the pension plans to develop a proposal to improve the city’s funding practices. 
However, Houston’s pension plans, like those in other major cities across the state, including 
Dallas, Austin, San Antonio, and Fort Worth, are controlled by the state legislature. This means 
that local leaders’ ability to implement changes to the system is limited, and any substantial 
reforms will require state approval. 
4 Houston’s fiscal year begins July 1 and ends June 30.
5 Ackerman, Todd. (Dec. 30, 2016). “For first time, city ends year with deficit.” Houston Chronicle. Retrieved from http://www.
   houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Houston-s-liabilities-exceeding-assets-fueled-by-10827756.php.
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Summary
Houston’s flawed funding practices are one of  the key drivers of  the city’s growing pension costs. 
The city’s proposal is intended to strengthen the plans’ financial security by making three primary 
changes to the pension systems.6
In addition, Houston would issue $1 billion in pension obligation bonds in order to shore up 
the municipal employees and police pension plans. The police plan and municipal employees 
plan would receive $750 million and $250 million, respectively, from the sale of the bonds, 
providing a significant infusion of cash into each plan.
The City’s Proposal
It would lower the assumed rate of  return to 7 percent for all plans, down from 8.5 
percent for the fire plan, and 8 percent for the municipal employees and  
police plans. Officials would also make the city’s Actuarially Determined Contribution 
in full each year, and the city would pay off  the pension debt within 30 years. 
To address the fact that lowering the assumed rate of  return would cause  
contributions to rise to a level that would be financially unsustainable for the city,  
the plans would implement benefit adjustments, including changes to Cost of  Living 
Adjustments (COLA) and additional savings accounts known as Deferred  
Retirement Option Program (DROP) accounts.7
A financial corridor provision would cap the city’s payments to the systems at five 
percentage points above the expected cost of  the pension plans. Workers would be 
required to make additional benefit adjustments or increase their contributions if  city  
contributions exceed that cap. This mechanism would provide relief  to taxpayers, 
who have thus far assumed the burden of  rising pension costs, and would shift some 
of  the market risk to workers.
6 The information included in this section is from actuarial analyses provided by the City of  Houston and the pension plans, and from publicly available sources such 
   as comprehensive annual financial reports. The projected effects of  reform may deviate from actual effects, as the Laura and John Arnold Foundation’s modeling is 
   based on the information included in these reports and does not reflect amendments or changes that might have been made during the legislative process. 
7 Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) accounts are intended to incentivize experienced employees to stay in the workforce. DROP offers workers who 
   are eligible to retire a guaranteed investment return in exchange for deferring their pension benefits. Employees can choose to withdraw their savings immediately  
   upon retirement or leave them in the account in perpetuity. When an employee withdraws the funds from his or her account, the savings and guaranteed 
   investment returns are paid out as a lump sum in addition to the individual’s monthly annuity benefit. 
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Analysis
LJAF’s analysis indicates that the proposed changes would improve the stability of  the pension 
systems. Lowering the plans’ investment assumptions to 7 percent would provide a more accu-
rate estimate of  Houston’s total debt, and help to ensure that the city sets contributions at an 
appropriate level to cover its retirement promises and pay down legacy costs.
Although Actuarially Determined Contributions would increase, city officials have proposed 
roughly $2.5 billion in benefit reductions that would lower the unfunded liability to $5.7 billion 
and keep pension payments at a level that Houston can afford.  
The financial corridor provision also provides a risk-sharing mechanism that would limit the 
impact of  future cost increases on taxpayers. Up to this point, taxpayers have picked up the tab 
for the city’s growing unfunded liabilities. As mentioned previously, pension payments have risen 
by hundreds of  millions of  dollars since 2000. Capping the city’s contribution rate would help 
to ensure that taxpayers are not solely responsible for covering increases in pension costs going 
forward.
However, the proposal’s impact on public workers would ultimately determine the sustainability 
of  the reforms. Defined Benefit plans require pension plan managers to make a number of
Source: Authors’ calculations; Houston Firefighters’ Relief  and Retirement Fund, Houston Municipal Employees Pension System, and Houston 
Police Officers’ Pension System comprehensive annual financial reports; Houston Firefighters’ Relief  and Retirement Fund, Houston Municipal 
Employees Pension System, and Houston Police Officers’ Pension System actuarial valuation reports; Guide to Public Retirement Systems in Texas 
by the Texas Pension Review Board; State Pension Review Board of  Texas Board Meeting – November 3, 2016 by the Texas Pension Review 
Board; HPOPS Pension Reform Cost Analysis by the City of  Houston and Retirement Horizons Inc.;  HMEPS Pension Reform Cost Analysis by 
the City of  Houston and Retirement Horizons Inc.; and Bureau of  Labor Statistics. 
Note: Pension debt is estimated using market value of  assets and 15-year conservative assumption of  approximate duration of  pension liabilities. 
Adjusted for inflation.
Graph 1. Houston Owes $8.2 Billion in Pension Debt (7 Percent Assumed Rate of  Return)
$20
$18
$14
$10
$6
$2
0
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Year
Pe
ns
io
n 
D
eb
t i
n 
Bi
lli
on
s 
(2
01
6 
D
ol
la
rs
)
$16
$12
$8
$4
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Pension Debt 
with Reform 
and POBs
Pension Debt
Pension Debt 
with Reform
Liabilities
Liabilities 
with Pension 
Reform
Assets
Assets with
POBs
Pe
ns
io
n 
D
eb
t i
n 
Bi
lli
on
s 
(2
01
6 
D
ol
la
rs
)
Year
10
www.arnoldfoundation.org
www.pensionsecurity.org
complex calculations about demographic and economic trends in order to assess how much  
money is needed to cover the cost of  benefit promises. Although the financial corridor provision 
is a reasonable approach to managing retirement costs, it could place an unfair burden on future 
public workers. 
Minor fluctuations in investment returns or other assumptions could result in large increases in the 
city’s contribution rate. As a result, plan members would be required to make additional benefit 
adjustments. Thus, the corridor provision could prove to be unsustainable in the long run if  
workers are forced to bear a disproportionate share of  the pension costs. Moreover, if  the
provision were to fail, the city has not proposed a back-up plan to address the issue. 
The city and the plans should take additional proactive steps to control pension contributions, 
including lowering the level of  risk in their portfolios over time; strengthening transparency and 
oversight of  their investments; and enrolling new workers in retirement systems that are simpler 
and easier to manage, such as a Defined Contribution plan or a Cash Balance plan. 
The Corridor Provision
The success of  the city’s proposal hinges on the implementation and management of  the financial 
corridor provision in particular. Under the corridor provision, actuarial studies performed by the 
city and the pension plans would be used to set a “midpoint,” which would reflect the city’s  
expected pension costs for the next 30 years. Minimum and maximum contribution rates for the 
city would be set five percentage points below and above the midpoint, respectively, and there 
would be a pre-specified set of  actions that local leaders would take if  the city’s contribution rate 
fell below the minimum or surpassed the maximum. Notably, if  costs were to exceed the  
maximum, the pension plans would be required to make changes, such as reducing benefits or 
increasing their contributions, to compensate for rising costs and bring the city’s payments back 
below the cap. 
The corridor provision—which is unique to Houston’s proposal and has not been tested in any 
other jurisdiction to date—would establish substantial financial protections for the city and  
The success of  the city’s proposal hinges on the
implementation and management of  the financial 
corridor provision in particular. 
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taxpayers. The impact on workers would depend on the plans’ investment performance and  
demographic trends, as these factors would determine how often the city’s contribution rate hits 
the cap. LJAF’s modeling estimates that even if long-term returns average 7 percent, there is a two 
in five (40 percent) chance that the city’s contribution rate would hit the proposed maximum for 
the police fund at least once by 2027. There is roughly a one in three (33 percent) chance that the 
city would hit that rate at least twice within that time period.
Another factor to consider when evaluating how the reforms would affect employees is the  
probability that the funds would achieve the expected rate of return of 7 percent as outlined in the 
proposal. That rate is below the current median rate for public pension plans, which is about 7.6 
percent. But the city would still be relying on assumptions that are more than four 
percentage points higher than the risk-free rate of return in order to pay down its debts. This 
means that Houston, and ultimately, workers and taxpayers, would continue to take on significantly 
more risk than public plans did in the 1990s, when assumed returns were much closer to the 
prevailing interest rates and nearly all public pension plans were fully funded.8
If Houston’s pension plans consistently miss the proposal’s expected rate of return by even one 
percentage point, the odds that the city’s contributions would hit the cap increase. For example, 
there is a one in two (50 percent) chance that the city would hit the contribution cap for the police 
plan at least once during the next 10 years if the plan’s long-term returns average 6 percent. In 
fact, if the plan consistently earns returns of 6 percent, it would hit the cap around 2024. If the 
plan consistently earns 5 percent returns, it is projected to hit the cap even sooner—around 2020.
Each time the city hits the cap, members would be required to increase their contributions by a 
minimum of 2.5 percentage points or would have to cut benefits by an equivalent amount. The 
benefit cuts would be at the discretion of the plans; however, it is likely that changes would be 
made to the COLA or the DROP because minor adjustments to either benefit can result in 
significant savings.  
If the police plan’s long-term returns average 7 percent, as the city anticipates, there is a one in 
three (33 percent) chance that member contribution rates would increase by five percentage  
points or more during the next decade.9 Contribution rates could also increase by more than 10 
percentage points, although that scenario is less likely if long-term returns match the plan’s  
assumptions. Over the next decade, the odds are about one in five (20 percent) that rates would 
increase by 10 percentage points or more for members of the police plan and one in seven 
(roughly 15 percent) that contribution rates would increase by 15 percentage points or more. 
The potential impact of the corridor provision would also vary across the funds. There is a greater 
chance that the city’s contributions would hit the cap for the police and fire plans than for the  
municipal employees plan. The police and fire plans have made larger benefit promises relative to
8 As of April 17, 2017, the risk-free rate of return was set at 2.3 percent. On average, pension plans assume nominal returns of 
  7.6 percent on their investment portfolios. In comparison, private investment firms, including Bogle and Nolan, Charles Schwab,     
  Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, and McKinsey & Company, have projected average annual returns of 7 percent or less for the 
  foreseeable future, according to a report released by the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College.
9 This is modeled using 7 percent as the long-term geometric average return with a standard deviation of 14 percentage points. 
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payroll and also hold more in assets. Therefore, it would be costlier for either of  those plans to 
make up for investment losses than it would be for the municipal plan.
If contribution rates were to dramatically increase for workers during the next 10 years, it would 
have a detrimental effect on Houston’s ability to recruit and retain public workers. City employees 
have already agreed to billions of dollars in concessions. Although Houston’s police officers and 
firefighters earn salaries above the national average for public safety personnel, under the proposal, 
they would contribute a higher percentage of their salaries to the pension systems than their peers 
across the country.10 Additional increases in contribution rates could affect employment in other 
ways. Economic research shows that changes to take-home pay often result in increased worker 
turnover as compared to when employers make changes to deferred compensation. The city has 
reportedly already seen a wave of retirements among police officers since the proposal was 
introduced.11
Pension Obligation Bonds 
If the proposal is approved, the city and the pension plans would need to take appropriate steps 
to avoid hitting the corridor cap given the impact it could have on workers. The city would need to 
make payments on time and in full, while the plans would need to adopt investment practices that 
take into account downside risk and place limits on allocations to volatile, complex, and 
hard-to-value assets such as real estate, private equity, and hedge funds, which often come with a 
hefty price tag. 
Another key obligation Houston would need to follow through on is its promise to provide a  
cash infusion to the police and municipal employees plans. City officials used pension obligation 
bonds as a bargaining chip during the negotiations, and officials owe it to public workers to make 
good on this promise in return for employees agreeing to accept substantial benefit reductions. 
However, the bonds also pose some risk to workers and taxpayers. In order to benefit financially, 
Houston would need to earn more in the market than it costs to borrow the money. If investment 
yields are lower than borrowing costs, the city will have to pay off the loan and make up the  
difference between earnings and what was promised to the plans. 
10 Fulton, Bill. (Oct. 25, 2016). “Houston’s Pension Reform Package: Our Latest Analysis.” The Urban Edge. Retrieved from 
http://urbanedge.blogs.rice.edu/2016/10/25/houstons-pension-reform-package-our-latest-analysis/#.WPeSslXyscU.
11 Morris, Mike. (Dec. 22, 2016). “Top commanders among surge in HPD retirements.” Houston Chronicle. Retrieved from 
http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/politics/houston/article/Top-commanders-among-surge-in-HPD-
retirements-10814708.php.
If  contribution rates were to dramatically increase 
for workers during the next 10 years, it would have 
a detrimental effect on Houston’s ability to recruit 
and retain public workers.  
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Historically, the city has been charged interest between 4.5 and 6.5 percent on pension bonds.12 
Under current market conditions, the spread between bond interest rates and expected returns is 
relatively small. According to data provided by the city and LJAF’s estimates, the maximum 
savings—or cost avoidance—that the city would generate through the issuance of  the bonds 
would be about 2 percent of  payroll for the police plan and 0.5 percent for the municipal plan.13 
Furthermore, there is a reasonable chance that it would cost the city more to borrow money than 
it would if  Houston were to contribute an equivalent amount to the plans over the same term as 
the loan. Despite the risk, the pension obligation bonds are a good-faith measure that indicate the 
city’s commitment to upholding its funding promise in the future. 
The bottom line is that the city’s proposal would make important changes to Houston’s pension 
systems that would help protect workers’ retirement security and improve the city’s overall 
fiscal health. It includes several elements of  foundational reform that would help to address the 
plans’ legacy costs. 
Going forward, the city will need to make additional changes to the plans’ investment policies to 
protect workers. Houston should also consider enrolling new employees in alternative plans that 
are simpler and easier to manage, such as a Defined Contribution plan or a Cash Balance plan, in 
order to ensure there is a comprehensive, permanent solution to the city’s pension problems.
Despite the risk, the pension obligation bonds are a 
good-faith measure that indicate the city’s commitment 
to upholding its funding promise in the future.
12 Houston issued about $586 million in pension obligation bonds during the mid-2000s. According to research conducted by the 
   Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, these bonds have not resulted in savings for the city. Rather, if the term of the 
   loan were to end today, the proceeds would be $18 million less than the amount owed to the bondholders.  
13 This projection assumes a 4 percent interest rate. 
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Conclusion
Houston’s $8.2 billion pension debt poses significant risks to workers and taxpayers. Without 
reform, citizens will be forced to make difficult decisions between cutting public services and 
raising taxes, while workers’ retirement security could be compromised. 
Local leaders should be commended for their efforts to reach an agreement and develop a  
proposal that would improve the pension systems’ financial stability. The proposal would  
accomplish key goals of responsible pension reform by establishing a plan to pay off Houston’s 
pension debt within 30 years and by providing a mechanism—through the financial corridor  
provision—to control future cost increases. However, more will need to be done in the future to 
establish a lasting solution to the city’s pension problems. 
The city’s proposal is an important first step. If state legislators give local leaders an opportunity 
to implement reform, Houston city officials will need to uphold their end of the bargain. They 
will need to make payments on time and in full. In addition, they will need to deliver on the 
promised pension obligation bonds, as workers have already agreed to a number of substantial 
concessions and are poised to bear considerably more investment risk. 
Going forward, Houston should make additional changes to reduce risk and protect workers, 
including limiting the amount of money allocated to volatile, hard-to-value assets. The city will 
also need to closely monitor the effect of the corridor provision. If the plans’ assumptions turn 
out to be overly optimistic and pension costs dramatically rise over time, the corridor provision 
could place an undue financial burden on future workers. In such a scenario, the city and the 
pension plans would need to act quickly and make additional reforms to address the situation.
The city should also consider adopting retirement plans for new employees that are simpler and 
easier to manage. These plans would provide additional protections for new workers and 
taxpayers. While placing new employees in a Defined Contribution plan or a Cash Balance plan 
would not reduce current unfunded liabilities, it would help ensure that the city does not 
accumulate large and costly pension debts in the future. It would also provide Houston with the 
flexibility to respond to changing economic and demographic trends.
Mayor Turner and members of the pension boards have shown leadership in their willingness 
to address Houston’s pension problems. The issue now rests with the state legislature. There are 
just a few weeks left in the 2017 session—and without the ability to make changes to the 
pension systems on its own—the city is running out of time. Without changes, the debt could 
spiral into a full-scale financial crisis. The city cannot allow that to happen. Its financial future 
hangs in the balance and will be decided in large part in the next month.
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Local leaders have made considerable progress. There is a deal on the table, and now is not the 
time to turn back. Houston’s proposal represents meaningful progress toward establishing a fair 
and sustainable solution to the city’s pension problems. 
Paying off  the pension debt will require shared sacrifice. The city must take action to improve 
the financial stability of  its plans and protect workers and taxpayers. Pension reform in Houston 
would allow the city to deliver on its promises to workers and preserve critical public services. 
Communities across Texas and around the nation are watching. If  the Houston plan is enacted, 
it has the potential to serve as a model for others looking for solutions to their own pension 
problems.  
Local leaders have made considerable progress. 
There is a deal on the table, and now is not the 
time to turn back. 
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Appendix 1
Pension Obligation Bonds 
Payable and Future Bonds $1,490 Million
Source: Authors’ calculations; Houston Firefighters’ Relief  and Retirement Fund, Houston 
Municipal Employees Pension System, and Houston Police Officers’ Pension System 
comprehensive annual financial reports; Houston Firefighters’ Relief  and Retirement Fund, 
Houston Municipal Employees Pension System, and Houston Police Officers’ Pension 
System actuarial valuation reports; Guide to Public Retirement Systems in Texas by the Texas 
Pension Review Board; State Pension Review Board of  Texas Board Meeting – November 3, 
2016 by the Texas Pension Review Board; HPOPS Pension Reform Cost Analysis by the City 
of  Houston and Retirement Horizons Inc.; and HMEPS Pension Reform Cost Analysis from 
the City of  Houston and Retirement Horizons Inc.
*Pension Obligation Bonds (POBs). 
Note: Pension debt is estimated using market value of  assets and Governmental Accounting 
Standards Board (GASB) net pension liability. If  the reforms are implemented, they would 
take effect July 1, 2017. The table reflects an effective date of  June 30, 2016. It takes into 
account GASB Statements Nos. 67 and 68.
Pension Plan $5,218 66% $4,315 72%
Houston Firefighters’ Relief  
and Retirement Fund $435 90% $435 90%
Houston Municipal Employees 
Pension System $2,414 50% $2,188 55%
Houston Police Officers’ 
Pension System $2,369 63% $1,691 74%
Pension 
Debt
(in Millions)
Funded 
Ratio
Funded 
Ratio
Pension 
Debt
(in Millions)
Without POBs* With POBs*
Pension Plan Funding Levels After Reform
General Fund Revenue $2,294 Million
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Appendix 2 Projected City Contribution Rates for theHouston Firefighters’ Relief  and Retirement Fund
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Appendix 2 Projected City Contribution Rates for theHouston Municipal Employees Pension System
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Appendix 2 Projected City Contribution Rates for theHouston Police Officers’ Pension System
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Appendix 3 The Impact of  the Financial Corridor Provision on theHouston Police Officers’ Pension System
Projected City Contribution Rate (7 Percent Assumed Rate of  Return)
5th percentile
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Projected City Contribution Rate After Reform (7 Percent Assumed Rate of  Return)
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Source: Authors’ calculations; Houston Police Officers’ Pension System comprehensive annual financial reports; and Houston Police Officers’ Pension System actuarial 
valuation reports.
Note: The model assumes a standard deviation of  14 percentage points. 
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